(SPACE BELOW FOR FILING STAMP ONLY) 1 SOLOMON E. GRESEN [SBN: 164783] JOSEPH M LEVY [SBN: 230467] LAW OFFICES OF RHEUBAN & GRESEN 15910 VENTURA BOULEVARD, SUITE 1610 3 ENCINO, CALIFORNIA 91436 TELEPHONE: (818) 815-2727 4 FACSIMILE: (818) 815-2737 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Cindy Guillen-Gomez 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 10 11 OMAR RODRIGUEZ; CINDY GUILLEN-CASE NO.: BC 414 602 GOMEZ; STEVE KARAGIOSIAN; 12 ELFEGO RODRIGUEZ; AND JAMAL Assigned to: Hon. Joanne B. O'Donnell, Judge CHILDS, Dept. 37 13 Plaintiffs, Complaint Filed: May 28, 2009 14 -VS-PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 15 DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION IN **BURBANK POLICE DEPARTMENT: CITY** LIMINE NO. 6 TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY 16 OF BURBANK; AND DOES 1 THROUGH OF OLIVER "LEE" DRUMMOND 100, INCLUSIVE. 17 Defendants. 18 TRIAL: 19 DATE: August 31, 2011 BURBANK POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY TIME: 9:00 a.m. 20 OF BURBANK, DEPT: 37 21 Cross-Complainants, 22 -VS-OMAR RODRIGUEZ, and Individual, 24 Cross- Defendant. 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion in Limine No. 6

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

In Defendant's so-called renewed Motion in Limine No. 6, Defendant seeks an order barring any testimony from Plaintiff's expert witness on police department policies, practices, procedures and training, Oliver "Lee" Drummond. Defendant does not challenge Drummond's qualifications as an expert on these topics, but seeks to exclude all testimony from him on the grounds that such testimony would not be sufficiently beyond common experience and would have no probative value.

Defendant relies on Kotla v. Regents of University of California (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 283. However, in Kotla the court held only that the trial court erred in permitting a human resources expert to offer opinion testimony about whether certain facts were "indicators" of a retaliation. The court held that a human resources expert may testify on a number of different issues, stating:

We fashion no general rule here precluding the use of human resources experts in employment cases. We are concerned solely with Dr. Finkelman's testimony that the facts in evidence were indicators of or had a tendency to show retaliation. Expert testimony on predicate issues within the expertise of a human resources expert is clearly permissible. For example, evidence showing (or negating) that an employee's discharge was grossly disproportionate to punishments meted out to similarly situated employees, or that the employer significantly deviated from its ordinary personnel procedures in the aggrieved employee's case, might well be relevant to support (or negate) an inference of retaliation. Opinion testimony on these subjects by a qualified expert on human resources management might well assist the jury in its factfinding.

(Kotla v. Regents of University of California (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 283, 294, Fn.6.)

Thus, under *Kotla*, *supra*, Drummond should be allowed to testify on predicate issues. It would be an abuse of discretion, therefore, to exclude his testimony entirely.

In Forbes v. ABM Indus., 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 696, (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2005), the court held that the limitation on an expert's testimony in Kotla, supra, does not apply where an expert identifies seemingly non-discriminatory acts that, when viewed globally, could indicate a pattern of discrimination. The court explained:

Moreover, unlike the expert in Kotla, Dr. Aamodt was helpful to the jury because he

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion in Limine No. 6

identified seemingly non-discriminatory acts by an employer that, when viewed globally, could indicate a pattern of discrimination. Dr. Aamodt opined that undercutting authority and reassigning responsibilities could signal an attempt on an employer's part to build a non-discriminatory case for termination when the true basis was discriminatory. Relevant here, is if the employer uses such tactics with female employees, but not with male employees, the practice could imply a discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. (Forbes v. ABM Indus., 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 696, 34-35 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2005) Thus, in the case at bar, Drummond should be allowed to "identify seemingly

Thus, in the case at bar, Drummond should be allowed to "identify seemingly non-discriminatory acts by Defendant that, when viewed globally, could indicate a pattern of discrimination."

In PM Group, Inc. v. Stewart (2007) 154 Cal. App. 4th 55, the court held that it was appropriate for an expert to testify about the custom and practices of the entertainment industry. The court stated:

The record reveals Sloane's testimony related primarily to the customs and practices of the entertainment industry, specifically, the music concert business. Because these customs and practices are sufficiently beyond common experience, Sloane's expert opinion was admissible to assist the trier of fact. Marx & Co., Inc. v. The Diners' Club, Inc. (2d Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 505, 508–509 [securities business]; Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 924 [148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 582 P.2d 980] [attorney properly could opine whether an insurance company acted in bad faith]; Evid. Code, § 801.)

(PM Group, Inc. v. Stewart (2007) 154 Cal. App. 4th 55, 63-64.)

Likewise, in the case at bar, Drummond should be allowed to testify regarding police department customs and practices – subjects that are beyond common experience.

In PM Group, supra, the court also held that "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." (Id.)

In Sitter v. Ascent Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73849, 2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011), the court noted that "numerous courts have permitted extensive testimony by human

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion in Limine No. 6

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704, "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Fed. R. Evid. 704. Accordingly, numerous courts have permitted extensive testimony by human resources experts. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Vancouver, No. C04-5539 FDB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13020, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5. 2009) (stating that "Plaintiff's expert may testify about the City's deviation from good human resources practices under Rule 702"; adding that the expert may not testify that "Defendants' failure to comply with good human resources practices is indicative of discrimination" but only because that specific testimony "is unlikely to assist the jury and runs the risk that the jury will pay unwarranted deference to [the expert's] expertise"); Nieto v. Kapoor, No. CIV 96-1225 MV/JHG, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22490, at *29-30 (D.N.M. Sept. 18, 1998) (allowing human resources expert to testify that "[d]efendants' conduct was deficient compared to societal norms" - e.g., that "[d]efendants both should have investigated [p]laintiffs' allegations and were remiss in not disciplining [d]efendant Kapoor or in not taking corrective action despite the warnings of various employees" — and that "[d]efendants' actions contributed to the creation of a hostile environment and caused the constructive discharge of Plaintiffs, with the caveat that the Court may instruct the jury on the elements of constructive discharge at an appropriate point in [the expert's] testimony"). (Sitter v. Ascent Healthcare Solutions, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73849, 2-3 (N.D. Cal.

July 8, 2011).)

In general, Drummond will testify regarding common police department policies, customs and practices. Comm police department policies, customs and practices are beyond common knowledge. Thus, under PM Group, supra, and the other cases discussed above, such testimony should be allowed. Specifically, Drummond should be allowed to testify as follows:

A. Failure to Act:

1. Under the Police Officer Standards and Training ("POST") and the Burbank Police

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion in Limine No. 6

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Departments ("BPD") own Investigation Policy, the BPD has a duty to investigate allegations of discrimination and harassment, and to take corrective action when warranted.

- 3. What the BPD's investigatory obligations are under POST and its own Investigation Policy, why these obligations are necessary and how they are used in police department common practice;
- 4. What common police department customs and practices exist for making sure POST and a department's own Investigative Policy are put into effect;
- 5. That the evidence shows that the BPD failed to comply with common customs and practices to make sure that POST and its own Investigation Policy are put into effect; and
- 6. That the evidence shows that the BPD failed to meet its obligations under POST and its own Investigation Policy, and how it failed to meet those obligations.

POST and Police department customs and practices are beyond common knowledge. Thus, under *PM Group, supra*, and the other cases discussed herein, the above testimony should be allowed.

B. Failure to Train

- 1. The BPD has a duty to train its employees regarding the proper method of performing an investigation, what that proper procedures are, and that the BPD failed to meet its obligations to properly train its employees regarding those procedures.
- 2. The BPD has a duty to train its employees regarding sexual harassment, the details as to what this duty requires, and that the BPD failed to meets its duty to properly train its employees regarding sexual harassment.
- 3. What common police department customs and practices exist for making sure employees are trained regarding sexual harassment and the proper method of performing an investigation;
- 4. That the BPD failed to follow common police department customs and practices for ensuring that its employees are properly trained regarding harassment and the proper method of performing an investigation.

Police department customs and practices are beyond common knowledge. Thus, under PM

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion in Limine No. 6

Even if this Court finds that one or more of the topics above would not be appropriate expert witness testimony, it would be an abuse of discretion to exclude all evidence by Drummond. Conclusion For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant's renewed Motion in Limine No. 6. DATED: August 25, 2011 LAW OFFICES OF RHEUBAN & GRESEN Attorneys for Plaintiff, Cindy Guillen-Gomez Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion in Limine No. 6

PROOF OF SERVICE

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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I am employed in the County of Los Angeles. I am over the age of eighteen and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 15910 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1610, Encino, California 91436.

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On August 25, 2011, I served a copy of the following document described as: PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DÉFENDANT'S RENÉWED MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 6 TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF OLIVER "LEE" DRUMMOND on the interested parties, through their respective attorneys of record in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

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Lawrence A. Michaels Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP 11377 West Olympic Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90064-1683 Facsimile: (310) 312-3100 Email: LAM@msk.com

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BY MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope(s) addressed as above, and placing each for collection and mailing on that date following ordinary business practices. I am "readily familiar" with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the U.S. mail Postal Service in Los Angeles, California, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

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BY FACSIMILE: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by facsimile transmission, I faxed the documents to the person(s) at the facsimile numbers listed above. The telephone number of the sending facsimile machine is (818) 815-2737. The sending facsimile machine issued a transmission report confirming that the transmission was complete and without error. A copy of that report showing the time of service is

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STATE: I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

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Executed on August 25, 2011 at Encino, California.

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Daphne Johnson

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Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion in Limine No. 6